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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
State pension contributions represent the single largest cost driver in the [S]tate’s operating 
budget.—Governor Sean Parnell, December 5, 20131 
[The retirement systems’ unfunded liability is] not a sexy topic.—Governor Sean Parnell, 
December 18, 20132 
Membership in employee retirement systems of the State or its political subdivisions shall 
constitute a contractual relationship. Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be diminished 
or impaired.—Alaska Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 
 
 
In early 2003, financial analysts working for the State of Alaska announced that the two largest 
public employee retirement systems in Alaska had become significantly underfunded.3  From 
fiscal year 2006 (July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006) to date, the state has paid $6.951 billion—
(an average of $534.7 million annually)—to pay down these obligations, which will be called 
“unfunded liabilities” in this paper.4 
The State of Alaska has substantial unfunded liabilities remaining to pay off for these two 
systems, the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) and the Teachers’ Retirement 
System (TRS). There is uncertainty about the size of these unfunded liabilities, and there are also 
different ways of calculating them. For example, the State of Alaska’s snapshot balance-sheet 
approach, subtracting the accrued liabilities from the assets, based on their actuarial value, 
produces an estimate of $6.609 billion for the combined unfunded liabilities of PERS and TRS.5  
That figure is an estimate of the unfunded liabilities discounted to the present day. 
Estimates of the size of the unfunded liabilities particularly vary based on the use of different 
critical assumptions, such as the rate of future returns on investment. As an example, using an 
estimated rate of return of 2.142 percent instead of the State of Alaska’s assumption of 8 percent 
produces an estimate of $33.9 billion for the state’s unfunded liabilities.6    
The State of Alaska has committed to paying off the unfunded liabilities under a 25-year 
amortization schedule that started in 2014, so another highly relevant measurement of those 
liabilities appears to be the amount actuaries for the state currently project will be needed under 
that pay-off plan, which runs through fiscal year 2039. The state’s actuaries project that from 
fiscal year 2019 through fiscal year 2039 the state will pay a total of $10.815 billion in extra 
contributions—called “state assistance” or “additional state contributions” in this paper—to pay 
off the unfunded liabilities.7  
In contrast to the state’s snapshot estimate of $6.609 billion, this estimate of $10.815 billion in 
state assistance represents a flow of annual cash payments. That is, the $10.815 billion is an 
estimate of the total amount needed to eliminate the unfunded liabilities of PERS and TRS under 
the 25-year amortization schedule the state adopted in 2014.  
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Note that this state assistance is above and beyond the amount the state is projected to owe in its 
role as employer in the normal course of funding the two systems.8 Employers other than the 
state—primarily local governments and school districts—also participate in PERS and TRS, and 
the figure for state assistance covers not only unfunded liabilities attributed to the state but also a  
portion of the unfunded liabilities attributed to non-state employers. As explained more later, the 
state has assumed, by statute, the responsibility to pay for a share of the unfunded liability of 
these other employers.9 
This paper: 
• Describes the structure of the Alaska public employee retirement systems in the context 
of some unusual features of public employment on the Last Frontier 
• Reviews how the problem of unfunded liabilities came about  
• Examines how concerns over unfunded liabilities produced both changes and proposed 
changes in the retirement systems over the past dozen years, including proposals for 
changes in the allocation of burdens between the state and local governments in paying 
for retirement benefits  
• Describes current projections of future amounts needed to pay off the unfunded liabilities 
• Discusses how future estimates of the unfunded liabilities might change in response to 
economic and demographic factors 
• Discusses legal provisions protecting the rights of beneficiaries of the retirement systems 
• Lays out options for policymakers—other than the current policy of paying down the 
unfunded liabilities over time—including buyout, bailout, and bankruptcy 
 
II. ALASKA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND DIFFERENT 
METHODS OF MEASURING THEIR SIZE AND FINANCIAL HEALTH 
The State of Alaska and local governments in Alaska10 provide retirement benefits to their 
employees. Those benefits include pensions and other benefits, primarily health insurance. 
The State of Alaska administers these public employee retirement systems for its own employees 
and for most local government employees in Alaska. It does so through five retirement 
systems11:   Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS); Teachers’ Retirement System 
(TRS); National Guard and Naval Militia Retirement System (NGNMRS); Judicial Retirement 
System (JRS); and Elected Public Official Retirement System (EPORS).12 
PERS covers a broad range of public employees in Alaska and has a total membership of 76,265, 
counting active members as well as retirees.13 The State of Alaska established PERS in 1961.14   
Participating employers in PERS include the state and more than a hundred smaller Alaska 
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organizations—mostly municipalities—ranging from the Municipality of Anchorage to the City 
of Upper Kalskag.15   
TRS has a total membership of 24,589.16 Employees eligible to participate in TRS include 
elementary and secondary school teachers, school nurses, and some faculty and administrators at 
the University of Alaska.17 TRS was created by the Territory of Alaska in 1955.18 Participating 
employers in TRS include the University of Alaska, the Alaska Department of Education, and 
more than 50 other Alaska organizations, almost entirely local school districts.19   
There are various ways to measure the size of a retirement system, but under all measures PERS 
and TRS are by far the biggest of the public employee retirement systems operated by the State 
of Alaska.20 The market values of the four largest retirement systems as of January 31, 2018 
were as follows21: 
Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS)   $18,963,427,435  
Teachers’ Retirement System (TRS)     $			9,230,531,308	 
Judicial Retirement System (JRS)     $     213,354,630	 
 
National Guard/Naval Militia Retirement System   $									40,832,242	
 
Members of various professions widely agree that PERS and TRS face shortfalls in meeting the 
two systems’ future obligations. But those different professions tend to view those shortfalls 
differently, depending on whether they are actuaries, accountants, or other professionals. 
Actuaries, for example, are people who deal with assessment and management of risk for 
financial investments and other ventures involving a measure of uncertainty.22 When speaking of 
a retirement system, actuaries tend to focus on its “actuarial value.” This is a value that is 
determined through a study of probable amounts of future pension or post-employment benefits, 
and the necessary amount of contributions to fund those benefits, based on a number of 
economic and demographic assumptions.23 
Accountants, on the other hand, are people who prepare and analyze financial statements and 
audits.24 Accountants tend to rely more on terms such as “net pension liability” and “net 
position.”25 (An actuary explained the difference between the professions this way: “Accountants 
measure what actually exists—we are measuring something that hasn’t happened yet.”26) 
Doing actuarial analysis is a difficult job, given the many assumptions that need to be made, 
particularly for traditional defined-benefit pension plans like PERS and TRS offered employees 
who started work on or before June 30, 2006. As one commentator has noted, “Funding a 
traditional pension plan involves relying on assumptions about life expectancy, wage growth, 
employee tenure, rates of disability, and investment returns.”27 
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This paper will focus primarily on actuarial projections in looking at the future of the public 
employee retirement systems operated by the state, because those projections lay out the 
estimated amounts needed to cover the shortfalls in funding future obligations of PERS and TRS. 
Here are some definitions of actuarial terms used in this paper.28 
The “actuarial accrued liability” is the total accumulated cost to fund pension or post-
employment benefits arising from service in all prior years. 
The term “valuation assets” refers to the value of pension plan investments and other property 
used by an actuary to prepare an actuarial valuation. This is also sometimes called “the actuarial 
value of assets.”29 
The “unfunded actuarial accrued liability” is the portion of the actuarial accrued liability not 
offset by a retirement system’s assets. (In this paper, “unfunded accrued liability” will be used 
interchangeably with “unfunded actuarial accrued liability.”)   The unfunded accrued liability is 
derived by subtracting the valuation assets from the actuarily accrued liability.30 
The “funded ratio based on valuation assets” is derived by dividing the valuation assets by the 
actuarial accrued liability.31 If the valuation assets are larger than the actuarial accrued liability, 
the funded ratio is above 100 percent. If the valuation assets are smaller than the actuarial 
accrued liability, the funded ratio is below 100 percent.   The state’s actuary for PERS has noted 
that “[T]he same measurements using market value of assets [as opposed to valuation assets] 
would result in different funded ratios and unfunded accrued liabilities.”32 
 
III. SOME UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN ALASKA 
Employers in the U.S. traditionally offered pension benefits to help attract and retain staff.33  A 
common view was that governments needed to offer a desirable pension package to compensate 
for the lower salaries often offered in public employment.34  That position had a special 
resonance in Alaska during the 1970s, as public employers felt a particular need to provide 
attractive pension and health-care benefits to compete with the high incomes Alaskans could 
earn working on construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline.35 Offering pensions to 
employees—particularly in the private sector—has declined in recent years.36 
Although not an exhaustive list, here are two other relevant considerations regarding public 
employment in Alaska. 
An important consideration in a discussion of retirement systems for public employees in Alaska 
is that while the great majority of employees in the United States participate in the Social 
Security system,37 most public employees in Alaska—except for those working for the federal 
government—do not.38 Public employees in Alaska who do not work for the federal government 
are thus among the approximately one-quarter of all participants in public pension programs who 
do not participate in the Social Security system.39 Those not covered by Social Security include 
employees of the State of Alaska, all teachers in public schools (whether or not those public 
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schools are operated—as almost all are—by local school districts), and employees of some local 
governments who are not teachers.40  
The Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) creates a statutory right for almost all public 
employees in Alaska—including teachers—to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining 
over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.41    Local governments—
known as “political subdivisions” of the State of Alaska42—can only reject the application of 
PERA if the rejection occurs prior to substantial organizational activity by public employees in 
reliance on their rights under PERA.43   
   
IV. ORIGINS OF UNFUNDED STATE RETIREMENT OBLIGATIONS 
The State of Alaska operates retirement systems that promise benefits in retirement and 
government-financed health care, but there is no legal requirement that those benefits be fully 
funded in advance.44  The potential for unfunded liabilities is particularly strong with defined-
benefit plans, in which the promise to an employee is of a specific dollar amount of retirement 
benefits, based on that employee’s salary history and length of employment.45    
Defined-contribution plans, on the other hand, do not promise a specific amount of benefits at 
retirement. In these plans, the employee or the employer (or both) contribute to the employee’s 
individual account under the plan, and these contributions may be invested either by the 
employers or the employees themselves. (In Alaska’s defined-contribution plan, the employees 
choose investments, under options the state offers.) The employee will ultimately receive the 
balance in that account, plus or minus investment gains or losses.46 
Pure defined-contribution plans do not carry the risk of creating unfunded liabilities.47 As 
detailed below, PERS and TRS switched from defined-benefit plans to defined-contribution 
plans for employees who began working on or after July 1, 2006. 
Concerns arose in 2003 about the solvency of PERS and TRS, by far the largest of Alaska’s 
retirement systems, and those concerns seemed to rise suddenly. Although reports issued in late 
2002 showed that PERS was more than 100 percent funded and TRS was 95 percent funded,48 in 
January 2003 the consulting actuary for PERS and TRS told a meeting of the boards governing 
the two retirement systems that large investment losses and substantial increases in projected 
medical costs required a tripling of the rate of employer contributions for the two systems.49 
The State of Alaska’s financial reports issued in December 2003 reflected a new picture, starkly 
different from the financial reports issued only 12 months before.50 The reports showed that as of 
June 30, 2003, PERS was only 75.2 percent funded and TRS 68.2 percent funded,51 leaving 
PERS with an unfunded liability of $2.9 billion and TRS with an unfunded liability of $1.4 
billion.52   Michael Barnhill, Alaska deputy commissioner of Administration, said in 2012 that an 
actuarial audit conducted in 2002 had uncovered the problems that led to the discovery of “the 
hole.”53   (The report of that audit was presented in October of 2002 to the boards administering 
PERS and TRS.54) 
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The Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for PERS, issued in December 2003, cited 
investment losses and increasing health-care costs as causes of the shortfalls in funding.55  But 
that report also said, “Over the long term, plan member and employer contributions as well as 
investment income received are expected to cover the pension benefit and postemployment 
healthcare costs of the Plan.”56  The TRS Comprehensive Annual Financial Report issued that 
same month had similar comments.57 
The funding ratios for the two retirement systems continued to deteriorate,58 however, and the 
list of causes for the unfunded liabilities grew over time, as more research was done. A document 
issued by the Senate Finance Committee in 200559 had a list including these factors: 
Ø Inaccurate actuarial assumptions 
Ø Historical underestimate of system liabilities 
Ø Rising costs of health care  
Ø Bearish periods in financial markets 
Ø Declining interest rates 
Ø “Unfavorable demographic changes” 
Ø “Artificially low contribution rates in good times” 
Three of these factors deserve special mention: “unfavorable demographic changes”; the stock 
market crash of the early 2000s; and Alaska’s extremely high health-care costs.   
“Unfavorable demographic changes” means that system beneficiaries were retiring earlier and 
dying later than actuaries had expected.60   
The problems of funding for PERS and TRS became obvious in the wake of reverses in the stock 
market in the early 2000s—the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell in each of the calendar years 
2000, 2001, and 2002—three years of the worst performance since the mid-1970s.61  One 
journalist noted in 2005 that the State of Alaska’s actuaries “had anticipated occasional bad years 
in projecting long-term earnings rates, but not three years in a row.”62 As the famed investor 
Warren Buffett wrote about this period in the markets, “After all, you only find out who is 
swimming naked when the tide goes out.”63 
Health-care costs are critical, particularly given that the State of Alaska’s public employee 
retirement systems provide health insurance as well as pensions, and studies have shown Alaska 
to have the nation’s most expensive64 health care. Those costs skyrocketed for PERS and TRS in 
the early 2000s, although those increases have moderated since then.65   As one journalist noted 
in 2005, the annual rate of growth in the cost of providing medical coverage to retirees jumped 
from an average of 4.5 percent in the 1994-1999 period to 14.5 percent for 2000-2004.66  The 
monthly cost for a PERS retiree’s health coverage was $57.64 in 1977, $806.00 in 2004, and 
$1,154.04 in 2016.67 To put that growth in context, while health insurance under PERS costs 20 
times as much as it did two decades ago, the Anchorage Consumer Price Index increased slightly 
more than three-fold over that period.68   
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In the assessment of one journalist in 2005, when taken together “the bad investment 
performance and higher-than-expected growth in costs of medical coverage account for over 90 
percent” of what was then $5 billion in unfunded liabilities for PERS and TRS.69 
V. STATE RESPONSES TO UNFUNDED RETIREMENT LIABILITIES 
The concerns about unfunded liabilities—coupled with pressures on the State of Alaska’s 
budget, caused by a long-term decline in oil production and worries about fluctuating oil 
prices—led to a number of changes and proposed changes over the past dozen years. This section 
provides a history of changes and major proposals for change. 
Below is a chronology of the State of Alaska’s responses to the problem of the unfunded 
liabilities first announced in the early 2000s. This timeline is a road map to the upcoming 
sections of this paper, which will flesh out the items listed in the timeline. 
Timeline of State Responses to Unfunded Retirement Obligations 
2005 Legislature amends statutes to change PERS and TRS for new hires from defined-
benefit plan to defined-contribution plan and reduce the State of Alaska’s share of 
health-care costs for new hires; the switch becomes effective for employees hired 
on or after July 1, 2006. 
2006 Aiming to pay off the retirement systems’ unfunded liabilities, the newly 
established Alaska Management Retirement Board substantially increases 
employer contribution rates for PERS and TRS, leading local governments to call 
for relief from the state. 
2007 Legislature provides for financial relief for local governments on PERS and TRS 
employer contribution rates for one year (fiscal year 2008). 
2008 Legislature adopts legislation setting local governments’ employer contribution 
rates at 22 percent of payroll for PERS and 12.56 percent for TRS, with the state 
to make payments amounting to the difference between the payments due under 
those statutorily set rates and the payments due under the rates determined by 
actuaries as necessary to pay off each retirement system’s unfunded liability  
2010 The management board and Mercer, the retirement systems’ former actuary, 
announce a settlement of a 2007 lawsuit, which had alleged Mercer committed 
actuarial errors and other misconduct; while admitting no wrongdoing, Mercer 
agrees to pay $500 million to the retirement systems. 
2014 Legislature adopts legislation that (1) injects $3 billion of the state’s money into 
TRS and PERS; (2) requires the management board to extend the amortization 
schedule previously adopted for paying off the unfunded liabilities for PERS and 
TRS; and (3) requires the board to use the level-percent of pay method to 
liquidate the unfunded liabilities, thereby overruling the board’s decision to use 
the level-dollar method. (The level-percent of pay method calculates amortization 
payments as a constant percentage of projected payroll over a given number of 
years, while the level-dollar method amortizes the cost into equal dollar amounts 
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to be paid over a given number of years. The level dollar method costs employers 
more up front, but provides significant savings later.)  
2015 The state attorney general issues opinion that the state is not legally responsible 
for the unfunded liability in PERS and TRS that is attributable to non-state 
employers—notwithstanding the state’s history of making “additional state 
contributions,” as set out in the 2008 state statute, to cover a portion of the 
unfunded liability that could be attributed to non-state employers. 
2016 Proposed legislation to shift more costs of PERS and TRS from the state to local 
governments and school districts fails. 
 
A. Statutory Changes in 2005: Switch from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution, 
Reductions in Retirement Medical Coverage, and Creation of Alaska Retirement 
Management Board (ARMB) 
 
By 2005, legislators were “stunned” by the growth in unfunded liabilities70 and searching hard 
for solutions. Lawmakers considered a raft of approaches during the two-year 24th Alaska State 
Legislature, sitting in 2005-2006, to address what one legislator called a “ticking time bomb.”71 
The options put forward varied in scale and seriousness. One idea on a list circulated at a 
legislative hearing in early 2005 was to encourage employees to leave public service before they 
vested.72 Other suggestions raised as either threats or possibilities to pay for the shortfalls were 
withdrawals from the Permanent Fund (with no elaboration on whether that was to be the 
principal or the earnings)73 and the use of future revenues from as-yet-undeveloped natural gas 
assets owned by the State of Alaska.74  
None of these ideas made their way into the law. Instead, the legislature adopted legislation 
implementing other far-reaching changes: (a) switching from a defined-benefit (DB) plan to a 
defined-contribution (DC) plan for calculating pension benefits for newly hired employees; (b) 
reducing the number of newly hired employees who could get retirement medical benefits paid 
for by the retirement systems; and (c) creating the Alaska Retirement Management Board 
(ARMB) to replace other boards in managing PERS and TRS. 
The most discussed change was eliminating the traditional defined-benefit plan for new 
employees and replacing it with a defined-contribution plan.75 The Alaska Division of 
Retirement and Benefits describes the defined-benefit plan as a system in which retirees “receive 
a defined monthly check, with the employer taking on the investment risk of the retirement 
funds.”76 The defined-contribution plan, by contrast, is a retirement savings account resembling a 
401(k) or 403(b) account and is “based on employee and matching employer contributions. If the 
employee’s investment choices perform poorly, or if the employee contributes little to the 
account, the employee receives less money at retirement.”77     
Supporters contended that this change to a defined contribution system would save money for the 
state, shift risk from employers to employees, and increase flexibility for employees.78 
Opponents, on the other hand, countered that the shift from defined-benefit to defined-
contribution would create too much risk for public employees (most of whom in Alaska are not 
  
11 
covered by Social Security)—thereby killing “the American dream of a secure financial 
retirement”79—and would thus harm recruitment and retention of public employees.80 
Among the diverse factors mentioned during legislative debate over the change was how age 
plays into comparisons between the two methods of pension-benefit calculation. As a consulting 
actuary noted at a legislative hearing in 2005, an employee’s view of the relative merits of the 
two systems might depend in part on that person’s age.81 Joseph Esuchanko said that a defined-
benefit system tends to favor employees over age 40 or 50, while a defined-contribution system 
may favor younger employees, apparently in part because the portability of a defined-
contribution plan works better for workers with more years left in the workforce.82    
The legislation switching to defined-contribution was considered in 2005 in an atmosphere 
featuring months of acrimony and arm-twisting83 in the state capitol and was partly affected by 
President George W. Bush’s simultaneous push for privatization of Social Security.84 Supporters 
of Senate Bill 141, the legislation in Alaska to adopt a defined-contribution system, tied the bill 
to legislation increasing the State of Alaska’s aid for education,85 and later “attempted to up the 
ante” by holding up the bill funding capital projects.86 Opponents of the legislation compared 
such tactics to “blackmail,”87 but the legislation passed in a special session, by one vote in the 
Alaska House of Representatives.88 
In signing the bill, Governor Frank Murkowski said, “This is not legislation that necessarily 
solves the problem.”89 He added that, “We think this change will stop the so-called bleeding.”90 
When coupled with previous changes, that shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
adopted in 2005 left PERS with four tiers and TRS with three tiers.   Tiers I, II, and III of PERS 
and Tiers I and II of TRS are defined-benefit plans.  Tier IV of PERS and Tier III of TRS, by 
contrast, are defined-contribution plans. Pursuant to the legislation adopted in 2005, Tier IV of 
PERS and Tier III of TRS are the retirement plans for employees who started service after June 
30, 2006.91  Each later-adopted tier reduced the benefits offered to those in the new tier, 
compared with what those in in the earlier-adopted tiers received.92 
Note that even after this hard-fought struggle in 2005, to shift from a defined-benefit system to a 
defined-contribution system that became effective in mid-2006, there continues to be a very long 
tail of defined-benefit payouts that will stretch for almost another 100 years. The State of 
Alaska’s actuaries assume that the latest payout under the defined-benefit system of PERS will 
occur in 2116, while the last payout under the defined-benefit system of TRS is projected for 
2111.93   
Although most of the attention on the legislation passed in 2005 focused on the shift from 
defined-benefit to defined-contribution, the bill also made several other changes.94 Most 
important for the issue of the continuing growth of unfunded liabilities, the new tiers adopted for 
PERS and TRS pursuant both reduced the number of people eligible for retirement medical 
coverage and shifted more of the responsibility for paying retiree health insurance premiums 
from the retirement systems to the retirees.95 An actuary for the State of Alaska told a legislative 
hearing in 2006 that the changes made in the new tiers of PERS and TRS result in health-care 
benefits that “are a lot less generous” than those offered in the tiers created earlier, and said that 
therefore “We would expect that…over time there should be a reduction in the growth of the 
health-care benefit liability.”96 
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In the same legislation enacted in 2005, the legislature also created the Alaska Retirement 
Management Board to manage the retirement systems, while abolishing three other boards 
previously responsible for such management.97 Among other duties, that new board was charged 
with the responsibility to “certify to...each employer... (A) an appropriate contribution rate for 
normal costs...and (B) an appropriate contribution rate for liquidating any past service 
liability.”98 
B. Legislative Action in 2007 and 2008: Concerns over Increasing Employer-Contribution 
Rates for Local Governments Lead to Adoption of Lower Rates for Local Governments, 
with the State Paying More to Compensate 
The years following the 2005 enactment of Senate Bill 141 saw repeated attempts to move bills 
that would return the retirement systems to a defined-benefit plan.99 Each of those efforts failed. 
After 2005, much of the action in the legislature involving retirement benefits moved to the 
question of the allocation of burdens between the state and local governments to pay off the 
unfunded liabilities associated with the defined benefit plans that remained in effect for all 
employees hired before July 1, 2006.100  (In 2006, the commissioner of Administration called 
these workers “legacy employees”.101)  
The adoption of Senate Bill 141 in 2005 had the effect of superseding a previous regulation that 
had limited annual increases in employer contribution rates to five percentage points as 
actuarially calculated.102 Charged with the duty of addressing the systems’ unfunded liabilities, 
armed with new data, and unfettered by that previous regulation, the new Alaska Retirement 
Management Board raised employer contribution rates for PERS and TRS in a rapid fashion that 
unpleasantly surprised local governments.103 For the defined-benefit plans, the new board in 
September 2006 set average employer contribution rates for fiscal year 2008 at 39.76 percent of 
payroll for PERS and 54.03 percent of payroll for TRS.104 
This average rate for PERS masked large differences for individual local governments, based on 
the amount of each local government’s unfunded liability.105 For example, while the City of 
Wasilla faced a 24.38 percent rate in PERS for Fiscal Year 2008, the City of Fairbanks was hit 
with a rate for that system of 180.94 percent.106 
This “huge jump”107 in employer contribution rates caused substantial consternation—even 
shock—among local government officials.108 The Anchorage School District pointed out that it 
paid a contribution rate of 24.25 percent for PERS in fiscal year 2007 and expected to pay a rate 
of 29.25 percent for the following year, but instead faced a rate of 40.89 percent.109 For TRS, the 
district had paid a 26 percent rate in fiscal year 2007 and expected to pay a 31 percent rate for the 
next year, but instead stared at a rate of 54.03 percent.110 
The reaction from local government officials was to seek relief from the deep pocket, the State of 
Alaska.111 A statement from the Anchorage School District said “The [d]istrict is counting on the 
Legislature to appropriate funds to all districts to relieve this extreme and unexpected burden on 
expenditures.”112   Carol Comeau, the district superintendent, called the rates “unacceptable” and 
stated “We urge Governor [Sarah] Palin and the Legislature to require the [s]tate to pay the 
mandated contributions directly into the retirement systems.”113 
  
13 
The big increases for local governments produced a drive to reduce those rates. Miles Baker, a 
legislative finance aide to Bert Stedman, R.-Sitka, co-chair of the state senate finance committee, 
told the Alaska Retirement Management Board in 2007 that the Palin administration, the 
municipalities, and the legislature all agreed that PERS had to be moved to a system of cost-
sharing.114 As summarized in the minutes, Baker also said, “The next thing everyone agreed 
upon was that the state has some responsibility to pay a portion of that—one, because 
municipalities cannot afford it, and two, because the state ran the system and there is some 
responsibility to step in and help.”115  
The legislature in 2007 adopted legislation that provided relief to local governments for one year 
only, fiscal year 2008. As a result of provisions included in budget bills passed during the 2007 
session, the actual rates employers were to pay for fiscal year 2008 in the PERS defined-benefit 
plan were set at no less than 14.48 percent for PERS employers whose actuarially calculated rate 
was less than 22 percent, and no more than 22 percent for PERS employers whose actuarially 
determined rate was greater than 22 percent.116  The “employer effective rate” for the TRS 
defined-benefit plan for fiscal year 2008 was 12.56 percent for all TRS employers.117 
Legislation adopted in 2008 provided that PERS employers would contribute 22 percent of their 
employees’ salaries, with the state paying the difference between that 22 percent and the amount 
needed to “pay the plan’s past service liability” (the unfunded liability).118 That same legislation 
set that rate at 12.56 percent for TRS employers, with the state again paying the difference as 
“additional state contributions.”119 The Alaska Department of Administration’s Division of 
Retirement and Benefits said the intent of that legislation was “to convert the PERS to a cost-
sharing plan, like the TRS, and provide for one integrated system of accounting for all 
employers. The bill establishes one uniform rate of 22 percent for PERS employers, rather than 
separate contribution rates for each employer.”120 
The legislative staff member discussing that legislation before it passed in 2008 described to the 
Alaska Retirement Management Board the legislative process behind the rate set for PERS.121 As 
summarized in the board’s minutes, Baker said in 2007 that “The concept was to set a flat rate 
for the municipalities and the state would pick up the risk and reward of what happens going 
forward. But because of the additional risk on the state’s part, the employer rate (22%) was set 
much higher than the municipalities wanted it set.”122  
The “additional [s]tate contributions” represent the amount needed to “amortize” (pay off) the 
unfunded liabilities over a period of 25 years.123 Those “additional [s]tate contributions” include 
payments to cover the amounts of the unfunded liabilities linked to the state, as well as amounts 
linked to municipalities.124 The total amount that the State pays—above its contribution normally 
required as an employer—is called “state assistance” in the projections made by the state’s 
actuary.125 (Journalists, legislators, and bureaucrats sometimes refer to these additional state 
contributions or state assistance as “on-behalf payments”.126 That terminology is misleading, 
because it suggests that the state is making those additional payments solely on behalf of non-
State employers, while in fact the payments also cover the state’s own portion of the unfunded 
liability. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board does not support the use of the term 
“on-behalf payments” in this context, apparently on the theory that you can’t make on-behalf 
payments on behalf of yourself.127) 
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C.  Lawsuit Filed in 2007 Regarding Actuarial Errors Ends in Settlement in 2010 
The Alaska Retirement Management Board sued the actuarial firm Mercer in December 2007, 
alleging that the company had made errors in calculating the state’s pension and health-care 
obligations that generated unfunded liabilities for PERS and TRS.128  Mercer had worked for the 
state as an actuary since the 1970s.129 Filed in state court in Juneau, the original complaint 
accused Mercer of engaging in actuarial misconduct, breach of professional duty, and breach of 
contract. It sought more than $1.8 billion in damages.130 
Mercer responded to the lawsuit filed by saying: “To the extent the state has funding issues, they 
are caused by a number of economic factors, including skyrocketing medical costs, a downturn 
in the capital markets[,] and the fact that retirees are retiring earlier and living longer than 
anticipated….The [s]tate is now attempting to hold Mercer accountable for these economic 
trends, over which our firm has no control.”131 
The actuary also contended that the boards administering PERS and TRS had declined year after 
year to boost the employers’ required contribution rates to the levels that Mercer recommended 
to keep the retirement systems fully funded.132 Mercer’s defense to the lawsuit also included a 
contention that the company’s conduct would not have negatively affected the state’s required 
contributions to PERS because during the relevant periods a state regulation imposed a cap of 
five percentage points on annual contribution rate increases for PERS employers, while Mercer’s 
recommended rate was already much higher.133   
Following depositions of Mercer employees, the Alaska Retirement Management Board in 2009 
filed an amended complaint that alleged a cover-up of its errors by Mercer amounting to fraud.134 
The amended complaint boosted the amount sought to at least $2.8 billion in compensatory 
damages—“subject to trebling under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Act”—plus punitive damages.135 Specific errors alleged included underestimating future health-
care costs and ignoring some salary increases for employees as well as survivor benefits.136 The 
lawsuit followed the report by another consultant for the state, finding mathematical errors by 
Mercer as well as the use of outdated mortality tables.137  
But with Mercer facing claims for a total damages award that—counting compensatory, treble 
damages, and punitive damages—could go up to $9 billion,138 the case never went to a jury. Less 
than a month before the case was scheduled to go to trial in Juneau in 2010, the state and Mercer 
announced a settlement ending the case, in which Mercer agreed to pay the state $500 million 
while continuing to deny wrongdoing.139 
Dan Sullivan, Alaska’s attorney general said at a news conference announcing the settlement that 
most of the proceeds of the settlement would go into the pension funds, while almost $100 
million would be used to pay legal costs for the case—which a New York law firm handled for 
the State of Alaska on a contingency fee basis.140 
The state now uses a different principal actuary, Conduent Human Resource Services (formerly 
Buck Consultants).141 
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D. Continued Concerns over Unfunded Liabilities Lead to Adoption of Legislation in 2014 
Injecting $3 Billion into Retirement Systems and Increasing Local Governments’ Liabilities 
1. Unfunded Liabilities Keep Growing 
Despite the changes made in the retirement systems in 2005, unfunded liabilities continued to 
grow, with the bear markets of 2008 and 2009 cited as a big factor.142 In the relatively flush time 
of 2011, a journalist described future costs of funding retirement benefits as the “one black 
mark” found “in the [s]tate’s otherwise stellar balance sheet” and said that some observers were 
warning that “[t]he [s]tate’s retirement costs, including growing medical expenses and unfunded 
pension expenses, may grow to unsustainable and crippling levels. . .”143 
 
By 2013, that same reporter pointed out that the problem had gotten worse, “with underfunding 
of pension and health-care plans growing by an additional $800 million this year” and total 
unfunded liabilities for PERS and TRS amounting to nearly $12 billion.144 Once again, weaker 
than expected investment returns were fingered as a major culprit.145  
 
2. Alaska Retirement Management Board Debates Alternative Methodologies 
 for Paying Off Unfunded Liabilities of PERS and TRS 
The Alaska Retirement Management Board worked to address its difficult legislative mandate to 
set employer contribution rates to pay off the retirement systems’ unfunded liabilities. The big 
issue was the choice of actuarial methodologies—which at heart involved a decision about 
whether to stretch out the payments or pay them off sooner. 
One option was the “level-dollar funding” method, and another was the “level-percentage of 
pay” method146 (also called the “level percent of payroll” method).147 As compared to the level 
percentage of pay method, the level dollar method provides significant savings over the long 
term, but costs more up front. 
The level-percentage of pay method “calculates amortization payments as a constant percentage 
of projected payroll over a given number of years.”148 The level dollar method, by contrast, 
amortizes the cost “into equal dollar amounts to be paid over a given number of years.”149 
One commentator offered this description of the level-percent of pay method:150 
Under the “level percent of payroll” method the actuary first estimates how much the 
government’s total payroll will be in each year of the amortization period assuming it will 
grow the same percent each year—usually projected at about four percent. Then the 
actuary calculates a fixed percentage of each year’s payroll the government needs to pay 
to eliminate the unfunded pension debt by the end of the amortization period. That fixed 
—or “level”—percent of each future year’s projected payroll is projected to be each 
future year’s payment. 
The same commentator also described the level-dollar method:151 
The “level dollar” method is basically the same as the traditional 30 [-] year fixed interest 
rate and payment home mortgage except the number of years can be shorter. You borrow 
money to buy a house and pay it back by making equal payments every month for 30 
years. Most of the early payments are interest but the last payments mostly reduce debt.  
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As noted above, the “level-dollar funding” method costs employers more up front, but provides 
significant savings later.152 
As an element of a plan to amortize the unfunded liability over 25 years, the management board 
in 2006 set employer contribution rates for the PERS defined-benefit plan based on the level-
dollar funding method, saying in 2007 that the method was “required” for a closed plan.153 In 
2007 the legislature adopted Senate Bill 123, which the board described as “allow[ing]” the use 
of the level-percentage of pay method. That same year the legislature also passed Senate Bill 53, 
which indicated the legislature’s intent that the level-percentage of pay method be used in setting 
employer contribution rates for fiscal year 2008.154   After the legislature passed those bills, the 
management board adopted the level-percentage of pay method in setting employer contribution 
rates for fiscal year 2008.155  
But in 2012, the board’s decision was different for both PERS and TRS going forward.156 “The 
board changed the amortization method used for funding from the level percentage of payroll 
method to the level dollar method in June 2012 effective June 30, 2012.”157 
That 2012 board decision had big effects. 
3. Concerns Over Growing State Payments to Cover the Unfunded Liabilities  
for PERS and TRS Lead Governor Parnell to Propose in 2013  
Legislation Injecting $3 Billion into the Retirement Systems 
In December 2013, the Parnell administration unveiled to the Alaska Retirement Management 
Board—in a conference room in a downtown Anchorage hotel—a proposal to take money from 
the state’s savings accounts to use for a one-time injection of $3 billion into PERS and TRS.158   
The room broke out in cheers and applause.159 
A newspaper article on the announcement noted two benefits to the state from the proposal.160 
One was the additional earnings expected to come from investing the $3 billion in PERS and 
TRS, given the assumption that the retirement systems would produce returns averaging 8 
percent a year versus the much smaller earnings expected from leaving that money in the state’s 
short-term savings accounts.161 The other benefit from “[t]he big bucks up front” would be to 
reduce state expenses in future years, which the governor’s budget director said “drove the 
decision to propose the $3 billion.”162 The article noted that the state’s annual expenditure for 
PERS was expected to rise to $703 million for the upcoming fiscal year (2015) and that “Parnell 
wants those contributions capped at $500 million as part of his $3 billion contribution 
proposal.”163 
The article also pointed out that the Alaska Retirement Management Board’s decision to adopt 
the level-dollar funding method “has helped force the issue after inaction by Parnell in recent 
years.”164 
The newspaper report concluded by noting that Gov. Sean Parnell’s proposal would put $1.88 
billion into PERS and $1.12 billion into TRS.165 
In a presentation later that month, Governor Parnell said he hoped his plan would result in fixed 
payments by the state of approximately $500 million a year over the next 25 years.166 
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4. Legislature Discusses in 2014 Various Ways to Reduce State’s  
Short-Term Burden for PERS and TRS 
Three conflicts predominated in the 2014 legislative debates on funding for the obligations of 
PERS and TRS. They can be summarized as:  
(a) Cheaper dollars vs. scarcer dollars 
(b) Flexibility versus predictability and stability 
(c) The state versus local governments as sources of funding 
Some of the debates focused on limiting the state’s spending on the retirement systems, 
particularly in the short term. Those taking this view argued that it was important to stretch out 
the amortization schedule for paying off the unfunded liabilities of PERS and TRS, on the theory 
that the time value of money meant that dollars spent in the future were worth less than dollars 
spent in the present.167 
Those opposing this “stretch out the payments to take advantage of the time value of money” 
view contended that likely future reductions in government revenues made that approach too 
risky. In the words of Martin Pihl, a trustee of the Alaska Retirement Management Board, “Some 
people say pay it off with cheaper dollars later, but I think the reality is, the cheaper dollars 
become scarcer dollars.”168 
Advocates also dueled over the concepts of flexibility169 versus predictability and stability. One 
reporter who followed the 2014 debates closely wrote that, “Many legislators have been reluctant 
to use [s]tate savings to pay down the unfunded liability now, when they may want to spend the 
money later on natural gas pipelines, capital projects in their districts, preventing school budget 
cuts, or unanticipated crises.”170 
Others involved in the debates emphasized the importance of predictability and stability in 
budgeting for the state171 and for local governments172 more than the preservation of state 
legislators’ maximum flexibility in the future, with the executive director of the Alaska 
Municipal League offering the view that “the crisis is already here” for local governments.173 
The director also pointed to a third question that was not always acknowledged in the 2014 
debates: Who would pay for the unfunded liability—the state or local governments?  
These conflicts played out as legislators considered various proposals during the 2014 session. 
The conflict over “Who pays?” was most obvious in a proposal that would have raised the cap on 
the PERS employers’ contribution rate from 22 percent to 24 percent as a way to get local 
governments to pay a greater share of the that system’s unfunded liability.174 While local 
governments tended to see the legislation adopted in 2008—establishing the 22 percent cap for 
local governments’ annual employer contribution rate—as a “commitment,”175 some legislators 
seemed to view it as a temporary favor.176 The stand-alone proposal to raise the PERS employer 
contribution rates ultimately failed, in the face of repeated entreaties from local government 
officials who warned of tax hikes on local taxpayers to pay for the higher rate.177 
Fears of higher employer contribution rates drove the debate in other respects. Kathie 
Wasserman, executive director of the Alaska Municipal League, expressed the fear that doing 
nothing to address the unfunded liability for PERS would lead the local governments’ 
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contribution rate to be increased to 40 percent178 (which was one percentage point more than 
what it would have been that fiscal year, without the 22 percent cap in statute).179 Wasserman 
said local governments recognized that Governor Parnell’s proposal for the $3 billion “cash 
infusion”180 also included an extension of the 25-year amortization of the unfunded liability that 
would impose additional costs on local governments. But she said they would accept those 
increased costs, rather than an increase in the annual employer contribution rate.181    
Wasserman put it this way: “When the [l]egislature says to me, ‘What are you guys willing to 
give?,’ I say ‘We’re willing to go ahead and know we’re going to be paying 22 percent for a lot 
more years than we’d been originally been told.”182 
The fight got a lot hotter in the last weeks of the statutorily set 90-day regular legislative session 
when house Republican leaders unveiled a proposal to switch TRS to a “pay-as-you-go” plan.183 
The proposal, developed by David Teal, the director of the Legislative Finance Division,184 
called for a $1.5 billion cash infusion, with $1.4 billion going into TRS and $100 million into a 
new pension reserve fund “from which transfers could be made if the trust fund got too low.”185 
Compared with Governor Parnell’s plan, the proposal called for starting with smaller annual 
payments that would be stretched over a longer period.186 Teal said that the “additional state 
contributions” would not be necessary under the proposal he had developed, and that the 
employer contribution rate would be increased to 24 percent over the following five years.187 
Advocates promoted the proposal as more affordable for the state than the governor’s plan, 
particularly given forecasts of smaller state revenues and ongoing budget obligations.188  
Opponents launched multiple attacks on the “pay-as-you-go” proposal.189 Michael Barnhill, 
deputy commissioner of Administration, described it as “a fairly radical change” in the state’s 
policy that contemplated the possibility that TRS would be exhausted in the early 2050s.190   
Angela Rodell, commissioner of Revenue, expressed concern that adopting the proposal could 
threaten the state’s credit rating.191 Governor Parnell called the proposal “immoral,” because it 
called for “pushing that debt off to our great-great grandchildren.”192 An actuarial analysis 
showed that the “pay-as-you-go” plan would increase costs for TRS contributions over the 
coming decades from $8.9 billion to $24.9 billion and extend the amortization schedule for an 
additional 20 to 30 years, likely out to 2073.193   David Teal, the architect of the “pay-as-you-go” 
plan, dismissed the actuary’s comparisons as “nothing short of nonsense” and observed that “The 
billions of dollars in future costs cannot be compared to current dollars unless one believes 
money has no time value.”194     
Strongly backed by Bill Stoltze, R.-Chugiak, co-chair of the house finance committee,195 the 
legislation containing the “pay-as-you-go” plan was approved by that committee,196 but the plan 
was defeated by the full House of Representatives and did not appear in legislation that passed 
the legislature.197   
5. Legislature Injects $3 Billion into PERS and TRS While Changing the Allocation 
 of the Cash, Re-Starting the 25-Year Schedule for Amortization, and  
Requiring the Use of the Level-Percent of Pay Method 
The legislature made three main statutory changes to PERS and TRS in the 2014 legislative 
session.198     
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First, the legislature made the cash infusion of $3 billion into PERS and TRS.199   But it 
essentially reversed the allocation proposed by Governor Parnell, putting $2 billion into TRS and 
$1 billion into PERS, when the governor had proposed $1.12 billion for TRS and $1.88 billion 
for PERS.200   Senator Pete Kelly, R.-Fairbanks and the co-chair of the senate finance committee, 
said the legislature made this decision explicitly because the state is responsible for paying a 
larger share of the unfunded liability for TRS than for PERS, which local governments are more 
responsible for.201 
Senator Anna Fairclough, R.-Anchorage,202 said the cash infusions would mean that TRS—then 
considered to be only 53 percent funded—would now be 73.9 percent funded, and she added that 
a funding level of 80 percent is considered adequately funded.203  (Note that there is considerable 
disagreement about the adequacy of funding public retirement systems at 80 percent. While one 
commentator has suggested that 80 percent is “good enough for government”—with the 
argument being that fully funded or overfunded public pension plans result in employees 
lobbying for more generous benefits or governments looking to cut benefits204—an opposing 
view is that “Pensions funded at 80 percent are no different than a $400,000 house in a distressed 
neighborhood with a $500,000 mortgage.”205)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
In a second action, the legislature required that the 25-year periods for amortizing the unfunded 
liabilities for PERS and TRS be re-started (“re-initialized”) so that they ran from July 1, 2014, 
through June 30, 2039.206 This extended the pay-off period by nine years; the periods adopted by 
the Alaska Retirement Management Board would have ended in 2030.207 
Finally, the legislature required that the Alaska Retirement Management Board use the level-
percent of pay method to liquidate the unfunded liabilities for PERS and TRS.208 
Both of the latter changes (stretched-out amortization periods and level-percent of pay 
methodology) were added in a bill—House Bill 385—that went from introduction to passage in 
both houses in less than two weeks at the end of the session.209 One reporter noted that “House 
Bill 385 passed unanimously but it was drafted in secrecy late in the session, and few legislators 
in debate or interviews later appeared to fully understand or be able to describe what it did.”210 
Both of those changes also reduce the short-term cost of paying off the unfunded liabilities while 
increasing the total costs. David Slishinsky, of the state’s principal actuary, Buck Consultants, 
told the Alaska Retirement Management Board that the legislative changes in 2014 added $5 
billion to total retirement costs,211 and also said the unfunded liability would actually increase for 
the first eight years of the new regime.212 Kris Erchinger, a trustee of the Alaska Retirement 
Management Board who also served as the City of Seward’s finance director, pointed out at a 
meeting of the board that the $1 billion appropriation to PERS “reduced the [s]tate assistance by 
$42 million a year and the House Bill 385 changes [re-started amortization schedule and level 
percent of pay] reduced the [s]tate assistance by $302 million a year.”213 
Finally, note that the weighting of the allocation of the $3 billion additional state contribution 
toward TRS rather than PERS had the intent and effect of shifting some costs of paying off the 
unfunded liabilities from the state to local governments.214   This is one place where the 
frequently used analogy of 15-year versus 25- or 30-year mortgages215 breaks down in the 
context of unfunded liabilities for PERS and TRS: In the home loan context, there is usually no 
issue about who makes the payments.216   
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E. Struggle Continues into 2015 over Issue of State’s Legal Responsibility for Unfunded 
Liability of Other Employers Participating in PERS and TRS  
Implementation of a new accounting standard fanned the flames of the debate over legal 
responsibility for paying off the unfunded pension liability, and in 2015 triggered dueling 
attorney’s opinions in on the “who pays?” question. This new accounting standard goes by the 
innocuous name of Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) Statement No. 68.217 
While implementing a new accounting standard effective for Fiscal Year 2015,218 the State of 
Alaska reported net pension liability “in relation to a special funding situation in the amount of 
[$3.542 billion].”219 The “special funding situation” was the responsibility of the State of Alaska 
for unfunded liabilities of the other employers (mostly municipalities and school districts) in 
PERS and TRS. 220 
Despite this reporting of the liability for this portion of future “additional state contributions”—
required under generally accepted accounting principles—the Alaska Department of Law issued 
a legal opinion in August 2015, holding that the State of Alaska is not legally responsible for that 
portion of the net pension liability of PERS and TRS.221 
The attorney general’s opinion acknowledges the statutes adopted in 2008, providing for the 
state’s obligation to make payments of “additional state contributions” that include a portion of 
the liability that could be attributed to non-state employers and the historical practice of making 
those payments.222 But notwithstanding the statutes and the historical practice, the attorney 
general’s opinion points to three provisions of the Alaska Constitution to support its position. 
The Appropriations clause states that “No money shall be withdrawn from the treasury except in 
accordance with appropriations made by law.”223 The clause titled “State Debt” generally 
prohibits the state from incurring debt except for capital improvements and other limited 
circumstances not applicable to this question.224 The Anti-Dedication clause prohibits the 
dedication of funds for “any special purpose, except as provided in section 15 of this article [the 
Permanent Fund] or when required by the federal government for state participation in federal 
programs.”225 The opinion also quotes an Alaska Supreme Court decision that says “The 
constitutional clause prohibiting dedicated funds seeks to preserve an annual appropriation 
model which assumes that . . . the legislature remain[s] free to appropriate all funds for any 
purpose on an annual basis....”226 
Relying on these legal materials, the attorney general’s opinion concludes that the statutes 
adopted in 2008 providing that the state shall make the payments for liabilities attributed to non-
state employers “cannot be interpreted to mandate future spending or dedicate funds for 
additional [s]tate contributions on behalf of other participating employers without raising serious 
problems with [the Alaska Constitution’s Appropriations and Anti-Dedication clauses].”227 
Rather than being “legal mandates to incur debt and assume the unfunded liability of 
participating employers,” the opinion suggests that the statutes in question are “discretionary 
municipal funding statutes that are subject to annual appropriation” by the Alaska Legislature.228 
In the course of reaching this conclusion, the opinion also warns of the consequences of taking 
the opposite view: that the state is legally responsible for the unfunded liability attributable to 
employers other than the state. The opinion notes that in 2012 the Alaska Retirement 
  
21 
Management Board made changes in its rate-setting methodology that put the state’s additional 
contributions on a course to exceed $1 billion in fiscal year 2016 (changes the legislature later 
reversed),229 while the state was projecting “only $2.2 billion in unrestricted general revenue” at 
the time of the opinion.230  “The notion that these statutes could essentially result in an earmark 
of 50 percent of the [s]tate’s general funds is not reasonable.”231 
The attorney for the Ketchikan Gateway Borough responded two months later with a legal 
opinion setting out a suite of arguments for the proposition that the state is legally responsible to 
make payments on behalf of non-state employers under the statutes providing for “additional 
[s]tate contributions.”232 Among those arguments is a contention that the statutes did not violate 
the Appropriations or Anti-Dedication clauses because the statutes expressly say that the state 
will make the payments each July 1 “or if funds are not available on July 1, as soon after July 1 
as funds become available….”233 Thus, a statute providing for “additional [s]tate contributions” 
and the payments on behalf of non-state employers embedded in them “is easily interpreted as 
constitutional because it is expressly subject to the availability of funds appropriated to pay down 
the unfunded pension liability.”234 
The opinion of the Ketchikan Gateway Borough also states that an implied exception to the Anti-
Dedication clause for pension fund contributions would likely lead the courts to rule 
constitutional the statutes establishing those payments.235 Disputing the reference in the state 
attorney general’s opinion to the state’s determination of the amounts of unfunded liability 
“attributable” to the state and to “participating [non-state] employers,”236 the borough attorney’s 
opinion maintains that “[T]he debt cannot be imposed upon participating employers because 
there is no accurate way to determine what portion of the [unfunded liability] is associated with 
any particular employer or former employer.”237  
Additionally, the borough attorney’s opinion says that “The state has fiduciary responsibilities as 
operator and manager of the system, obligations to retirees as the operator and manager of the 
system, and a role as a funder of last resort.”238 
The opinion concludes that “In short, the state has a legal responsibility to make payments 
towards the NPL [Net Pension Liability] of TRS and PERS under AS 14.25.085 and AS 
39.25.280 at the rates set by the ARMB as required to amortize the PERS and TRS unfunded 
pension liability over a closed 25[-]year period ending June 30, 2039.”239 
Three months after the Alaska Department of Law issued its opinion, staff of the Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board (GASB) advised State of Alaska officials that for the purposes of 
GASB 68 the term “legally responsible” should not be construed in a legally enforceable 
sense.240 Instead, GASB staff said that (a) the reporting of net pension liability attributable to 
special funding situations on the state’s balance sheet reflected the “economic reality” that the 
state is making state assistance payments on behalf of other employers participating in PERS and 
TRS pursuant to state statutes and (b) the existence of such statutes—regardless of their 
constitutional validity—required the state to report these amounts as liabilities on the state’s 
balance sheet.241 The Alaska Division of Legislative Audit also advised other state officials that 
the constitutional prohibition on dedication of revenue, and limitations on one legislature binding 
  
22 
the appropriation power of a subsequent legislature, are not permissible exceptions to GASB 
68.242 
The state now reports the amounts associated with the special funding situation on its balance 
sheet while simultaneously (a) disclaiming “any and all legal responsibility or obligation, in a 
legally enforceable sense, for the non-state employer GASB 68 net pension liabilities reported as 
liabilities” on the state’s financial statements and (b) acknowledging the different positions on 
this matter taken by municipalities and school districts participating in PERS and TRS.243 
 
F. Attempts in 2016 to Raise Employer Contribution Rates for PERS and TRS Fail Quickly 
Faced with an estimated $4.1 billion deficit244—an amount equal to about three-quarters of the 
budget for fiscal year 2016245—powerful legislators pushed again in 2016 to raise the maximum 
employer contribution rates for PERS and TRS, in an attempt to shift costs from the state to local 
governments.246    
One bill proposed increases in the PERS contribution rate from the existing 22 percent to 24.5 
percent in FY 2017, 25.5 percent in FY 2018, and 26.5 percent for FY 2019 and future years.247    
The other bill proposed increases in the TRS contribution rate from the existing 12.56 percent to 
19 percent in FY 2017, 20 percent in FY 2018, 21 percent in FY 2019, and 22 percent for FY 20 
and future years.248 Both bills were introduced by the senate finance committee.249  
The state’s actuary estimated that the senate finance committee’s bill on PERS would generate 
total state savings of $1.1 billion through FY 2039, when state employer contributions and state 
assistance contributions are considered together,250 while the TRS bill was forecast to produce 
$2.1 billion in total savings over the same period.251  
The two bills faced intense opposition to this substantial shifting of costs onto local 
governments, as well as a backlash against the fast-tracked consideration of legislation 
introduced three weeks before the end of the statutory limit of the legislative session.252 The 
senate leadership announced a week after the bills were introduced that it was dropping the 
PERS bill, and the TRS bill never moved from its first committee of referral.253 
 
VI.  PROJECTED FUTURE COSTS OF MEETING UNFUNDED  
RETIREMENT OBLIGATIONS OF PERS AND TRS  
As noted above, the State of Alaska’s actuary projects that the state will need to provide an 
additional $10.815 billion through fiscal year 2039 to fully fund its two largest retirement 
systems for public employees, under the plan adopted in 2014 to amortize the unfunded 
liabilities over 25 years.254 This estimate of $10.815  billion in state assistance—or additional 
state contributions—is of the total amount needed to eliminate, under that plan, the unfunded 
liabilities of the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) and the Teachers’ Retirement 
System (TRS). This figure for state assistance is above and beyond the amounts the state is 
projected to owe in its role as employer in the normal course of funding the two systems.255   
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Of this total of $10.815 billion through Fiscal Year 2039, the projection for PERS is $5.9 billion 
and the projection for TRS is $4.9.256 
For both PERS and TRS, those projected amounts of state assistance increase every year from 
fiscal year 2018 up until fiscal year 2040, when they go to zero.257   Particularly given the 
continuing strains on the State of Alaska’s finances, those projected amounts of state assistance 
are substantial.   
Here are some selected projected amounts of state assistance258: 
Fiscal Year 2021 $383,271,000 
Fiscal Year 2025 $425,976,000 
Fiscal Year 2030 $510,284,000 
Fiscal Year 2035 $629,880,000 
Fiscal Year 2039 $808,612,000 
These are big numbers, given that the total state Unrestricted General Fund budget—which is 
what people usually mean in Alaska when they talk about the budget—is $4.3 billion for fiscal 
year 2018.259  
Those projected figures for state assistance also loom large when matched up against the state’s 
projected future revenues. The Alaska Department of Revenue’s forecast goes out for nine years, 
and the projection for annual Unrestricted General Fund revenues for that period of fiscal years 
2018 through 2026 range from a low of $1.83 billion in FY18 to a high of $2.18 billion in 
FY26.260 
The substantial drop in revenues the state has experienced in the past five years—Unrestricted 
General Fund revenues fell from $9.5 billion in fiscal year 2012 to $1.6 billion in 2017261—has 
helped make Alaska’s problem with unfunded liabilities look particularly severe in the national 
context. A study released in 2017 showed that when measured against annual revenue, Alaska 
had the second highest unfunded pension liability of any state, with its unfunded pension liability 
equal to 443 percent of its annual revenue.262  
Recent changes in the funding ratios, as well as projected future funded ratios, show the 
importance of assumptions and the big differences they can make in projections of future 
unfunded liabilities. The funding ratio for a retirement system is the relationship between the 
actuarial assets and accrued liability. Driven in part by investment returns well below the 
projected 8 percent returns, funding ratios for PERS and TRS have declined recently.263  For 
PERS, the funding ratio based on valuation assets has fallen from 78.3 percent as of the end of 
fiscal year 2015 to 77.1 percent as of the end of fiscal year 2016, while for TRS the has gone 
from 83.3 percent to 82.8 percent.264 The state’s actuary expects those funding ratios to decline 
further before starting to go up again, with fiscal year 2021 expected to be the future low for both 
systems (PERS at 71.6 percent and TRS at 76.2 percent).265 
These projections of future needs for state assistance to pay off unfunded liability, and of funding 
ratios, are based on certain assumptions—and small differences between those assumptions and 
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actual experience can make a big difference.266 Some of the most important assumptions in the 
most recent actuarial projections for PERS and TRS include: 
Ø Investment returns of 8 percent on the Fair Value of Assets in all future years267 
Ø Total inflation increasing at 3.12 percent annually, as measured by the Anchorage 
Consumer Price Index for urban and clerical workers.268  
Other key assumptions include those about mortality rates of beneficiaries.269 
Factors driving the State of Alaska’s actual costs in ways that could make these projections of 
required state assistance incorrect include: 
Ø   Rates of return on investments (the lower the rates of return, the higher the state’s costs) 
Ø   Health-care inflation rates (the higher the health care inflation rate, the higher the State’s 
costs) 
Ø   Demographic changes (despite some offsets involving Medicare, it is generally true that 
the earlier beneficiaries retire, the more health problems they have while living, and the 
later they die, the higher the state’s costs) 
Ø   The state’s ability to transfer to local governments some of the costs of the retirement 
systems currently borne by the state, as set out in Alaska statutes 
Ø The ability of the state to prevail against legal challenges, if it attempts to reduce the 
value of benefits to beneficiaries   
Drawing particular attention has been the use of 8 percent as the “discount rate,” a term in 
economics related to the present value of future payments that plays a big role in funding 
determinations about defined-benefit pension plans.270 The lower the assumption for the discount 
rate, the bigger the liability and the lower the funded status—which drives up the amount that 
needs to be contributed to the pension fund.271 For both PERS and TRS, the Alaska Retirement 
Management Board uses 8 percent (compounded annually and net of expenses) as both the 
assumed discount rate and the assumed investment rate of return for the retirement system 
funds.272 That assumed 8 percent return on long-run investments includes an assumption of 4.88 
percent real return, plus an assumed inflation rate of 3.12 percent.273 
Lowering the discount rate by a single percentage point—that is, dropping the discount rate from 
8 percent to 7 percent—increases the net pension liability of PERS by 31 percent274 and of TRS 
by 41 percent.275 Raising that discount rate from 8 percent to 9 percent, on the other hand, 
decreases the net pension liability of PERS by 26 percent276 and of TRS by 34 percent.277    
Recent failures to meet that 8 percent benchmark in annual returns has led to “robust 
discussions” about whether that figure should continue to be used, according to an actuarial 
consultant for the state in April 2017.278 Those robust discussions will also take note of the 
higher investment returns racked up in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2017, when PERS earned 
13.35 percent and TRS gained an almost identical 13.36 percent.279 
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VII. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BENEFITS 
UNDER ALASKA AND FEDERAL LAW 
 
Alaska law and federal law both contain provisions relevant to public employee retirement 
benefits. Those legal provisions affect the options that policymakers might consider in dealing 
with the annual outflow of state assistance as the State of Alaska faces a continuing fiscal 
squeeze. This section sets out those relevant legal provisions, before the next section lays out 
various options to address the unfunded liabilities. This section sketches out those options 
without in any way pretending to address them in the depth needed for an article in a law review. 
 
A. Alaska’s Constitution Explicitly Protects Benefits of Employee Retirement Systems of 
the State and Local Governments 
Article XII, Section 7, of the Alaska Constitution provides that “Membership in employee 
retirement systems of the State or its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual 
relationship. Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be diminished or impaired.” For ease of 
reference, this paper calls this provision Alaska’s Public Retirement System Protection clause. 
B. Provisions of the Alaska and U.S. Constitutions Regarding the Impairment of 
Contracts and Takings280  
The Alaska Constitution provides that “No law impairing the obligation of contracts…shall be 
passed.”281 
The U.S. Constitution states that “No State shall . . .  pass any…Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts….”282 The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that this provision—commonly called the 
Contracts clause—does not automatically invalidate any modification of a contract provision by 
a state government, and that certain modifications can be justified as an exercise of a state’s 
police power, particularly in emergencies.283 But courts employ more scrutiny under the 
Contracts clause when a state government adopts a law modifying a contract to alter its own 
contractual obligations.284   
The U.S. Constitution also provides that “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”285  The Alaska Constitution states that “Private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”286    
VIII. OPTIONS TO ADDRESS THE UNFUNDED LIABILITIES IN LIGHT OF  
LEGAL PROTECTIONS AND OTHER REALITIES 
 
The serious and continuing fiscal squeeze on the State of Alaska will probably lead policy-
makers to consider other steps to deal with the annual outflow of state assistance.  A review of 
history and the relevant literature helped produce this list of options. Note that the author is not 
endorsing or opposing any option: merely describing them. 
A. Pension Obligation Bonds 
The State has repeatedly flirted with the idea of selling bonds to pay off some portion of the 
unfunded liabilities.287  The legislature in 2008 adopted legislation supported by Representative 
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Mike Hawker (R.-Anchorage), allowing pension obligation bonds to be issued, but those plans 
were shelved after the stock market crash later that year.288 
The idea is arbitrage, with the state taking on debt at relatively low interest rates and paying off 
that debt with money earned from investments generating rates of return presumed to be higher. 
Independent of the business case for them, pension obligation bonds postpone and spread the 
costs of meeting pension obligations, making them attractive to politicians.289 Following 
criticism from legislators—including that the proposal involved too much risk—the 
administration of Governor Bill Walker announced in the fall of 2016 that it was dropping a plan 
to sell such bonds.290 
B. Bankruptcy 
One time-honored way in the U.S. for debtors to deal with creditors is to declare bankruptcy and 
have the debts re-organized—and often reduced—in a court-approved plan. Federal bankruptcy 
law, however, prohibits states from filing for bankruptcy, and some scholars argue that the U.S. 
Constitution does so as well.291 With several state governments in financial trouble over the past 
decade—and the beleaguered Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filing in 2017 for a form of court-
supervised debt restructuring akin to bankruptcy—there has been repeated discussion of 
amending federal law to allow a state to file for bankruptcy.292  
Beyond the legal restrictions on any state declaring bankruptcy, there is another giant practical 
issue regarding any attempt by the State of Alaska to pursue that option. That would be the State 
of Alaska’s impressive balance sheet, particularly compared to the “highly distressed cities and 
states” often cited in discussions about governments with pension funding problems.293 The 
state’s fiscal circumstances have clearly deteriorated in the last few years—given that oil 
revenues averaged 90 percent of Unrestricted General Fund revenues for the period 2005-
2014,294 oil production in Alaska has declined approximately 75 percent since the late 1980s,295 
and world oil prices have fallen substantially from the levels of mid-2014.296  But it is also true, 
that the State of Alaska—home of fewer than 740,000 people297—has a Permanent Fund with a 
balance of more than $59 billion as of its most recent annual report.298  Of that total, more than 
$47 billion is in the principal or corpus (which under the Alaska Constitution cannot be spent 
absent a constitutional amendment) and more than $12 billion are earnings, which can be spent 
by a simple majority vote of the Alaska Legislature.299 This large pot of money would seem 
likely to loom large in any discussion of bankruptcy—as well as a number of other options on 
this list (particularly those involving relief from courts). 
C. Shift Costs to Local Governments, Perhaps as a Trade to Allow Local Governments  
to Declare Bankruptcy 
As discussed above, legislators have discussed proposals in the last few years to raise the 
employer contribution rates to shift more of the burden of paying for the retirement systems’ 
unfunded liabilities from the state to local governments, and it is likely that this idea will keep re-
appearing. Note also that the state could offer relief to local governments as well, by adopting a 
statute to allow municipalities to declare bankruptcy. Federal bankruptcy does specifically allow 
local governments to declare bankruptcy, although under a 1994 statute this is only true if the 
state in which the local government is located has specifically authorized that step.300 Alaska is 
in a large minority of states that have not authorized municipalities to declare bankruptcy.301 
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If the state did specifically authorize local governments to declare bankruptcy—or the law was 
changed to allow a state to declare bankruptcy—such a move could have big effects.  In a widely 
noted decision issued in 2013 regarding the City of Detroit, a federal bankruptcy judge ruled that 
provisions in the Michigan constitution similar to Alaska’s Public Retirement System Protection 
clause302 and Alaska’s Contracts clause did not bar the impairment of pensions owed by the City 
of Detroit.303 Specifically, the ruling said, “The state constitutional provisions prohibiting the 
impairment of contracts and pensions impose no constraint on the bankruptcy process.”304  The 
municipal bankruptcy in Central Falls, Rhode Island, led to pension payments being cut by 55 
percent, while municipal general obligation bondholders were paid in full.305    
D. Federal Bailout 
Alaska is not the only state with unfunded liabilities in its public retirement systems.  A Pew 
study identified more than a dozen states with public retirement systems funded at a lower 
percentage than Alaska’s, with systems in Kentucky, Illinois, and New Jersey being the most 
underfunded as of 2015.306   
Some commentators have raised the possibility of the federal government stepping in to help 
states facing substantial unfunded liabilities in public retirement systems, perhaps through a 
federal pension reform commission that could provide bridge financing or guarantee pension 
restructuring bonds.307 As of this writing, however, such federal assistance appears unlikely. 
E. Benefit Reductions Secured through Collective Bargaining 
Public employee unions could be legally allowed to bargain away benefits for members in 
negotiations with the State of Alaska, and this option might see more attention in future years.308 
But it is difficult to see how this idea would work with those retirement system beneficiaries who 
are not union members—which would of course include current pensioners. 
F. Buyouts of Benefits 
Commentator Eric Madiar has noted that legislators in Illinois have considered proposals that 
would address current pensioners by paying them an immediate lump sum in return for them 
foregoing recurring pension payments.309 If those lump sum payments were for amounts less 
than the net present value of the pension benefits, the government would save money. 
Implementing this proposal would require the consent of each individual beneficiary, to take the 
smaller amount upfront instead of the larger amount over time. 
G. Potential Amendments to the Alaska Constitution 
An obvious question is whether the pension protection or contract provisions—or both—of the 
Alaska Constitution set out above could be amended or repealed to allow the unilateral reduction 
of public employee retirement systems after such benefits have been offered.  
Let’s start with the Alaska Supreme Court’s interpretation of Alaska’s Public Retirement System 
Protection clause—and some recent instructive decisions from the highest court of a state with a 
similar provision—before looking at possible constitutional changes and the potential effects of 
such changes on different beneficiaries of Alaska’s public retirement systems. 
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First, recall the language of the provision itself: “Membership in employee retirement systems of 
the State or its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual relationship. Accrued benefits 
of these systems shall not be diminished or impaired.”310 
1. Alaska Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Alaska’s  
Public Retirement System Protection Clause 
The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that “system benefits offered 
to retirees when an employee is first employed and as improved during the employee’s tenure 
may not be ‘diminished or impaired.’”311 Those protected benefits include health-insurance 
benefits, as the court has stated that its own precedents suggest that the term “accrued benefits” 
in the constitutional provision “should be defined broadly.”312 
The Alaska Supreme Court has also held that “the rights to benefits vests when the employee 
enrolls in the retirement system, rather than when the employee is eligible to receive the 
benefits.”313 This “first day” interpretation of when rights attach—as one group of scholars 
noted—makes Alaska “extremely protective of public employees’ and retirees’ pension 
expectations….”314 The Alaska Supreme Court has also ruled that the state constitution also 
protects retirement system beneficiaries’ rights to have the actuarial soundness of their plans 
evaluated and maintained separately, without being affected by the soundness of other plans.315 
This provision regarding pension benefits in the Alaska Constitution does not, however, mean 
that benefits cannot be altered.316 “Reasonable modifications are permissible” even after rights 
are “accrued” (also described as “vested”).317 For a court to rule such modifications are 
reasonable, “changes that result in disadvantages to employees should be accompanied by 
comparable new advantages.”318 
The Alaska Supreme Court has also noted its general agreement with the proposition that 
modifications may be made “for the purpose of keeping a pension system flexible to permit 
adjustments in accord with changing conditions and at the same time maintain the integrity of the 
system.”319 Additionally, the Alaska Supreme Court has twice said that it has offered no view as 
to the appropriate legal analysis regarding the problem “presented by a pension fund that is 
insufficient to satisfy all employee claims brought under its provisions.”320 
2. Instructive Recent Decisions from Illinois, a State with a Pension Protection Clause  
Similar to Alaska’s Public Retirement System Protection Clause 
Alaska is one of apparently only seven states with state constitutional provisions explicitly 
protecting pension benefits,321 and it is instructive to look at recent judicial decisions from one of 
the other six. Illinois has both a provision in its state constitution substantially similar to 
Alaska’s322 and a well-documented fiscal crisis that has stretched over years.323 
The Illinois Supreme Court relied on “the pension protection clause” in the Illinois Constitution 
to strike down, in 2015 and 2016, legislative enactments that would have reduced benefits for 
public employee retirement systems.324 
In 2015, the court ruled that neither dire economic circumstances nor the state’s “reserved 
sovereign power” (also called its “police power”) could allow the State of Illinois to reduce 
pension benefits.325 Regarding the fiscal exigency confronting the Prairie State, the court said 
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that the legislature “made no effort to distribute the burdens evenly among Illinoisans”326 and 
noted that one alternative to cutting pension benefits was to seek “additional tax revenue.”327 
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in a 2016 case that “the pension protection clause” “guarantees 
pension participants will receive the money due them at the time of their retirement.”328 This 
provision means, the court held, that the benefits of membership in public retirement systems 
“must be paid in full, and that they must be paid without diminishing or impairing them.”329 As 
the commentator Kirk Jenkins noted, this language suggests—without expressly saying so—that 
“there might be extreme circumstances someday in which the [c]ourt might be willing to order 
funding to enforce the employees’ ‘legally enforceable right.’”330 The commentator Amy B. 
Monahan has pointed out, however, that courts’ traditional reluctance to appear to intrude on 
core legislative functions of spending and taxation might make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain 
a court order that would provide the requested relief, particularly in circumstances of great fiscal 
distress.331 
3. Potential Changes in Alaska Constitution to Allow  
Reduction of Public Retirement System Benefits 
Consideration of potential changes to the Alaska Constitution requires that we distinguish among 
different categories of beneficiaries and different proposals. Given that the unfunded liabilities 
are a problem of defined-benefit plans, the action is around those members who first entered 
PERS or TRS prior to July 1, 2006, the cutoff date for entry into those systems’ defined-benefit 
plans. Generally speaking, the payment of benefits to retirees are the most legally protected, both 
under the Contracts clause and the Takings clause.332 Among current employees, the benefits for 
services already performed are generally more likely to be legally protected than the benefits to 
be owed for services performed in the future.333 
Having distinguished among classes of beneficiaries, let’s look at potential constitutional 
amendments: (a) a repeal of Alaska’s Public Retirement System Protection clause and (b) an 
amendment of Alaska’s Public Retirement System Protection clause that would change the 
definition of “accrued benefits” in that clause to mean only those benefits earned through 
services provided prior to the date of the constitutional amendment. 
A constitutional amendment repealing Alaska’s Public Retirement System Protection Clause 
would face significant constitutional hurdles in accomplishing everything its supporters might 
wish. First, the repeal might be interpreted to apply only to benefits earned after the effective 
date of the constitutional amendment—which would significantly limit the amendment’s 
effectiveness in reducing the unfunded liabilities.334 It is also possible that the Alaska Supreme 
Court would view the PERS and TRS employees’ pension rights as unilateral contracts, the 
terms of which were intended to bind employers to allow employees to earn benefits throughout 
their careers at the same or very comparable levels to those provided by the formula established 
at the time of their initial employment.335 If that were the ruling, a constitutional amendment 
repealing Alaska’s Public Retirement System Protection clause would not be effective in 
reducing the unfunded liabilities associated with benefits of participants in the PERS and TRS 
defined-benefit systems, even after the effective date of such amendment. 
More generally, a constitutional amendment repealing Alaska’s Public Retirement System 
Protection clause would likely still face challenges based on the Alaska and federal Contracts 
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clauses. Under the federal Contracts Clause, a law substantially impairing a contract—even if not 
unilateral—can only be justified if the change in the contract is justified by an important public 
purpose and is reasonable and necessary.336  Courts mount inquiries into the facts to make those 
determinations in this area of the law.337 Given that “a State is not free to impose a drastic 
impairment when an evident and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally 
well,”338 courts look at the alternatives confronting the government when the decision was made 
to impair the contract.339 In conducting such inquiries, courts consider matters such as the facts 
about the taxation levels of the governments involved, compared with the national average340—
and Alaska’s status as the state with the lowest taxes in the country341 would appear to count 
against it on that score. Even without reliance on the federal Contracts Clause, beneficiaries 
might also bring successful lawsuits alleging breach of contract in tort law that could trigger 
substantial awards of damages.342 
 
A constitutional amendment that eschewed repeal but instead attempted to narrow the scope of 
the benefits covered would change the definition of “accrued benefits” in Alaska’s Public 
Retirement System Protection clause to mean only those benefits earned through services 
provided prior to the date of the constitutional amendment.343  Such a proposal would also face 
the Contracts clause challenge described in the previous paragraph. 
 
Other factors likely to play into future judicial decisions include the courts’ recognition of the 
legitimate reliance of employees and retirees on their employers’ promises,344 and the fact that 
the members of many retirement systems (such as most public employees in Alaska) do not 
participate in the Social Security system.345 
  
H. Arguments that Courts Have Made Incorrect Interpretations of the Scope of “Accrued 
Benefits” and Should Scale Back the Definition of What the Alaska Constitution Protects  
Some commentators have contended that the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted Alaska’s 
Public Retirement System Protection clause to protect more benefits more broadly than is 
supported by a fair reading of the text of Article XII, Section 7.346 More specifically, that article 
protects “accrued benefits,” but the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted that language to mean 
that “the right to benefits vests when the employee enrolls in the retirement system, rather than 
when the employee is eligible to receive the benefits.”347 In a seminal 1981 decision, the court 
held that benefits under a public employee retirement system like PERS (or TRS) “are in the 
nature of deferred compensation and that the right to such benefits vests immediately upon an 
employee’s enrollment in that system.”348 The court also said in that decision “these benefits are 
regarded as an element of the bargained-for consideration given in exchange for an employee’s 
assumption and performance of the duties of his employment.”349 
To assess the potential success of an attempt in litigation to persuade the Alaska Supreme Court 
that it should overrule its previous ruling, it is worth looking in detail at the 1981 decision in 
which the Alaska Supreme Court made that holding.350     
The court identified four factors351 in issuing its ruling that Alaska’s Public Retirement System 
Protection clause protects benefits from the day the employee enrolls in the retirement system: 
the “plain meaning” of the text of the constitutional provision; the intent of that provision; the 
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precedents of court decisions from other states; and “reason.” (The Alaska Supreme Court has 
also said it decides questions of constitutional interpretation by adopting “the rule of law that is 
the most persuasive in the light of precedent, reason, and policy.”352) 
As to the intent of the framers, the court cited the commentary to the Alaska Constitutional 
Convention of 1955, which said that the constitutional provision “will assure state and municipal 
employees who are now tied into various retirement plans that their benefits under these plans 
will not be diminished or impaired when the Territory becomes a state.”353 
Regarding reason or policy, the court quoted at length from the commentator Rubin G. Cohn,354 
who wrote that355  
The universally recognized primary objectives of retirement plans are to enable the 
employer to attract better employees, to reduce turnover, to facilitate orderly retirement 
of older employees, to retain valuable employees who might seek more productive 
employment elsewhere, and, most importantly from the employee viewpoint, to assure a 
measure of income upon retirement adequate to allow the annuitant to live in reasonable 
security. 
According to the commentator, governments must compensate for the lower salaries almost 
always offered in public employment as compared with those in the private sector by offering 
“an attractive and liberal retirement plan.”356 The Alaska Supreme Court said it agreed with the 
commentator’s description of the role benefit plans play in government employment.357 
 
IX. CONCLUSIONS 
The large costs associated with the unfunded liabilities of PERS and TRS will likely lead to 
continuing controversy over the two retirement systems. These unfunded liabilities are very 
substantial, and under the latest actuarial projections amount to 19 to 20 percent of the State of 
Alaska’s projected Unrestricted General Fund revenues for fiscal years 2021 and 2025.358 These 
obligations are uncertain in their precise amounts and could rise or fall. What does seem certain 
is that the unfunded liabilities of PERS and TRS need to be considered in any discussion of 
Alaska’s continuing fiscal challenge. 
The State of Alaska has a deep structural deficit that has generated substantial debates about 
Permanent Fund restructuring proposals, continued budget-cutting, changes in the oil and gas tax 
system, and possible broad-based taxes.359 As the columnist Dermot Cole has pointed out, these 
discussions often do not grapple with the full scope of Alaska’s fiscal challenge, which includes 
pressures for increased capital spending (including deferred maintenance) as well as the Last 
Frontier’s particular problem with health-care costs that have for years escalated much faster 
than the overall inflation rate.360 Another unappreciated dimension is the overhang of old debts 
from unfunded liabilities of public employee retirement systems, which will be paid off in part 
by Alaskans now too young to vote, not yet born, and not yet resident in the state.361 
The continuing controversy over the unfunded liabilities will include the question of the State of 
Alaska’s responsibility for those portions of the obligations that could be attributed to employers 
other than the State of Alaska.    
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There may well be more attempts in the future by the state to avoid or re-allocate the obligations 
to pay the unfunded liabilities. Such efforts will be legally tricky, and could borrow from some 
of the ideas that have arisen in other states facing large unfunded liabilities in public employment 
retirement systems, as well as the substantial list of policy options offered by commentators. 
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